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While the philosophical literature has extensively studied how
decisions relate to arguments, reasons and justifications, decision
theory almost entirely ignores the latter notions. In this article, we
elaborate a formal framework in order to introduce in decision the-
ory the stance that decision-makers take towards arguments and
counter-arguments.We start from a decision situation, where an in-
dividual requests decision support. We formally define, as a com-
mendable basis for decision-aid, this individual’s deliberated judg-
ment, a notion inspired by Rawls’ contributions to the philosophical
literature, and embodying the requirement that the decision-maker
should carefully examine arguments and counter-arguments. We
explain how models of deliberated judgment can be validated em-
pirically. We then identify conditions upon which the existence
of a valid model can be taken for granted, and analyze how these
conditions can be relaxed. We then explore the significance of our
framework for the practice of decision analysis. Our framework
opens avenues for future research involving both philosophy and
decision theory, as well as empirical implementations.
∗This is the postprint version of the article published in Theory and Decision,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09722-7. The text is identical, except for mi-
nor wording modifications.
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1. Introduction
Introducing their “reason-based theory of choice”, Dietrich and List (2013) no-
ticed that, although the philosophical literature has largely illustrated the use-
fulness of the concepts of reasons and arguments to think through action and
decisions, decision theory strives to account for the latter exclusively in terms
of preferences and beliefs. Despite Dietrich and List’s (2013; 2016) efforts, the
gap remains large between philosophical and choice theoretic approaches.
This gap echoes a classical dichotomy in “moral sciences” between, on the
one hand, first-person justifications of one’s acts in terms of reasons and ar-
guments structuring these reasons, and on the other hand, third-person repre-
sentations in terms of beliefs and preferences (Hausman, 2011). By neglecting
reason-based and other argumentative accounts, decision theory tends to de-
value decision-makers’ understanding of their own actions.
This gap has tended to insulate decision theory from important philosoph-
ical debates in the past thirty to forty years. Among the most influential
approaches in these debates, Scanlon (2000) highlighted the links between rea-
sons, justification and moral notions such as fairness and responsibility, Haber-
mas’ (1981) “theory of communicative action” articulated the importance of
justification and argumentation as distinctive features of rational action, and
Rawls (2005) launched the debates on the “acceptability” (Estlund, 2009) of
reasons and arguments for public justification.
This gap also has important practical implications for decision analysis, by
complicating the task for analysts to explain the recommendations they give
to their clients. This, in turn, casts doubts on these recommendations, which
appear to be imposed to rather than endorsed by decision-makers.
In this article, we aim to participate in unlocking this situation, by elabo-
rating a framework designed to allow decision analysts to provide recommen-
dations that decision-makers truly endorse, in empirical reality.
For that purpose, we introduce, as a commendable basis for recommenda-
tion, the “deliberated judgments” of the decision-maker. Roughly stated, these
“deliberated judgments” represent the propositions that the decision-maker
will consider to be well-grounded, if he duly takes into account all the relevant
arguments. This concept is inspired by Goodman’s (1983) and Rawls’ (1999)
notion of reflective equilibrium. It also owes much to Roy’s (1996) view that
an important part of the decision support interaction consists, for the analyst,
in ensuring that the aided individual understands and accepts the reasoning
on which the prescription is based.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we define our core concepts,
including the central concept of deliberated judgments. In section 3, we then
2
explore the issue of how empirical data come into play and are involved in
the validation of models. This illustrates the empirical aspect of our frame-
work, which distinguishes it from standard prescriptive approaches. Obviously
enough, at this stage, the pivotal issue is to determine how one can say any-
thing about “deliberated judgments”, given that, for any non-trivial decision,
the potentially relevant arguments are infinitely numerous. Lastly, section 4
discusses the significance of our approach for the practice of decision analysis
and outlines future empirical applications.
2. Core concepts and notations
In this section, we start by presenting the general setting of our approach,
including our understanding of arguments and of the topic on which the in-
dividual aims to take a stance. We then introduce our formalization of argu-
mentative disposition, capturing an individual’s attitude towards arguments.
This eventually allows us to present our notion of “deliberated judgment”.
2.1. General setting
Our approach starts from and is largely structured by the point of view of
decision-analysis. We accordingly assume that a decision situation has been
identified: we admit that there is an individual i who requests decision sup-
port to answer questions such as: “is action a better than action b?”, or “which
beliefs should I have about such or such matter?”. We consider that a topic
T – a set of propositions on which the decision analysis process aims to lead
the decision-maker to take a stance – is defined.1 We do not formally define
propositions and simply understand the notion in its ordinary sense. For ex-
ample, a proposition can be a claim spelled out in a text in a natural language,
such as the claim that action a is the most appropriate action for i in a given
decision situation.
We also consider arguments that can be used by i to make up her mind
about propositions in T . Here we understand the notion of argument in a
large sense: anything that can be used to support a proposition, or undermine
the effectiveness of such a support, is an argument. In the latter case, we talk
about a counter-argument. Arguments as we understand them can encompass
1We remain at a fairly abstract level in our conceptualization of the topic. We accordingly
set aside all the issues concerning the construction of problems and the evolution of their
meaning as the decision process unfolds in concrete decision situations (Rosenhead and
Mingers, 2001).
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a huge diversity, ranging from very basic arguments that can be stated in a
couple of words, to intricate arguments embedding numerous sub-arguments
associated to one another in complex ways.
Let us then define the set S∗ that contains all the arguments that one uses
when trying to make up one’s mind about T . S∗ can be understood in a
“pragmatic” sense, as the set of all the arguments available around the tempo-
ral window of the decision process. It can also be understood in an “idealistic”
sense, as the set of all the arguments that can possibly be raised, including
those that humankind has not yet discovered.2
Observe that under both interpretations, in all decision situations but the
most trivial, it will be untenable to assume that the analyst knows all of S∗:
the analyst will only know a strict subset S ⊂ S∗, containing the arguments
that she has been able to gather.3 An important part of our work in this
article will be to identify conditions allowing to draw conclusions relating to
S∗ despite the fact that no one ever knows more than a strict subset of S∗.
Example 1 (Ranking). Let us simply illustrate the content of the concepts
introduced so far. Let A be a set of alternatives that i is interested in ranking.
For all a1 6= a2 ∈ A, define ta1≻a2 as the sentence: “a1 ought to be ranked
above a2”, and ta1∼a2 as “a1 ought to be ranked ex-æquo with a2”. Define
T =
⋃
a1 6=a2∈A
{ta1>a2 , ta1∼a2} as the set of all such sentences. The topic T
represents the propositions on which i is interested to make up her mind.
Define S∗ as the set of all strings corresponding to sentences in English. This
set contains formulations of all the arguments that people can think about and
use to make up their mind about the topic, and much more. An example of
an argument is s = “Alternative a1 ought to be ranked above a2 because a1 is
better than a2 on every criterion relevant to this problem”. △
Our aim in the remainder of this section is to define formally i’s perspective
towards the topic after he has considered all the arguments that are possibly
relevant to the situation. We term this: i’s Deliberated Judgment (DJ).
2Because no one has a concrete access to such an idealistic set of all the arguments, we
expect that this concept will be mainly useful for philosophical explorations, and that
the pragmatic interpretation will prevail in practical applications.
3Even under the pragmatic interpretation, claiming that S = S∗ would mean that there
is no relevant knowledge beyond what the analyst can find by studying the literature
and consulting experts and stakeholders, but also that the list of arguments she has
found captures all the semantic and linguistic subtleties that could distinguish alternative
formulations of arguments.
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2.2. Argumentative disposition
To define i’s DJ, we need to capture i’s attitude towards arguments. Impor-
tantly, we also need to capture the fact that i may change her opinion about
arguments and their relative strengths. She can change her mind because of
reasons independent of her endeavor to tackle the problem she addresses, for
example depending on her mood. More interestingly, i will possibly change
her mind when confronted with new arguments. For example, imagine that
i has heard about two arguments, s1 and s2, and she thinks that s2 turns s1
into an ineffective argument. But then she comes to realize that s2 is in turn
rendered ineffective by a third argument, s3. After having thought about s3,
it might be that i no longer considers that s2 undermines s1.
Note that for simplicity’s sake, we say that an argument becomes ineffective
(because of another argument) to mean that it becomes ineffective in its ability
to support some proposition or to render other arguments ineffective.
Le us introduce our formalism to account for such a situation.4
4Our approach to formalize this concept is inspired by formal argumentation theory in
artificial intelligence (Dung, 1995; Rahwan and Simari, 2009). However, the latter ap-
proach is not sufficient to empirically investigate i’s attitude towards arguments, because
it neglects two crucial tasks. First, this literature does not investigate the role that the
decision analyst plays when she interacts with a decision-maker: should she remain a
neutral observer, or should she interact more tightly with the decision-maker by provid-
ing him with arguments and counter-arguments liable to lead him to change his mind?
Second, this literature does not put emphasis on the specific challenges involved in inter-
acting with a decision-maker to identify empirically the arguments he endorses. Most of
the time, this literature considers situations where the relation between arguments can
be computed from a given logical representation of the arguments (Besnard and Hunter,
2008) or is given a priori (Baroni and Giacomin, 2009), possibly integrating uncertain-
ties (Hunter, 2014) and dynamics (Rotstein et al., 2010; Marcos et al., 2011; Dimopoulos
et al., 2018).
Its most common use assumes that it is possible to establish the objective relations
between arguments. In our example, s3 would be considered to objectively attack s2
and s2 to objectively attack s1. However, in some cases, it might be difficult, or perhaps
even impossible, to determine such objective relations. In any case, this distinction is
superfluous if the goal is to inquire about i’s opinion about these relations between ar-
guments. Other proposals in formal argumentation theory (Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002;
Bench-Capon, 2003; Amgoud et al., 2008; Amgoud and Prade, 2009; Bench-Capon and
Atkinson, 2009; Ferretti et al., 2017) supplement an objective attack relation with infor-
mation representing i’s subjectivity, such as his values or his preference over arguments.
Such approaches seem closer to our aim, but they also use an objective attack relation,
in addition to the subjective information. Furthermore, this approach assumes that it is
possible to distinguish between, on the one hand, cases where s3 attacks s2 but i does not
deem this attack important, and on the other hand situations where s3 does not attack
s2. This assumption is also unnecessary for our purpose. Because our aim is mainly em-
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Let us start by defining a set of possible perspectives P that i can have
towards the topic T . A perspective p ∈ P captures all the elements determining
how i would react to arguments in S∗. In p, i has a specific set of arguments
in mind, which can partly determine his reaction to other arguments in S∗.
But other elements can come into play, such as (to come back to our example
above) his mood.
If the decision analyst provides i with a new argument s, this might lead i to
switch from p to another perspective p′ integrating both s and the arguments
that i had in mind in p, and possibly other arguments that i might have been
led to construct when trying to make up his mind about s and its implications.
i’s perspective can also change over time, because he forgets some arguments.
We forcefully emphasize that we do not claim to be able to provide a com-
plete account of all the elements encapsulated in this notion of perspective.
In fact, our approach does not even require to believe that it is possible for
anyone to capture the content of perspectives, or more generally to directly
measure details about i’s internal states of mind. The notion of perspective
merely serves as an abstract device allowing to ground the idea that i may
have changing attitudes towards some pairs of arguments.
Based on these notions, given T and S∗, define i’s argumentative disposi-
tion towards T as (↝,⊲∃,⋫∃). These three relations, described here below,
constitute the formal primitives of our concept of argumentative disposition.
↝ is a relation from S∗ to T . An argument s supports a proposition t, denoted
by s↝ t, iff i considers that s is an argument in favor of t. We emphasize
that this definition should be understood in a conditional sense: s ↝ t
means that i considers that, if s holds in her eyes, then she should endorse
t, but this does not say anything about whether she thinks that s holds.
An argument s may support several propositions in i’s view, or none.
⊲∃ is a binary relation over S
∗ representing whether i considers that a given
argument trumps another one in some perspective. Let s1, s2 ∈ S
∗ be
two arguments. We note s2 ⊲∃ s1 (s2 trumps s1) iff there is at least one
perspective within which i considers that s2 turns s1 into an ineffective
argument.5 Let us emphasize that we are concerned with how i sees s2
pirical, we propose to use another formalism, more adapted to our specific purpose, and
leave aside here the task of more fully exploring the relations with proposals in formal
argumentation theory such as dynamic argumentation.
5Note that, contrary to the usual assumption in formal argumentation theory, we do not
consider it possible that both s2 trumps s1 and s1 trumps s2 in a given perspective.
This is a choice of modelization, and not an hypothesis about the way i thinks: for
s2 ⊲∃ s1 to hold, by definition of our “trump” relation, s2 must be a sufficiently strong
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and s1, not about whether s2 should be considered to be a good argument
to trump s1 by any independent standard.
⋫∃ is a binary relation over S∗ defined in a similar way: s2 ⋫∃ s1 iff there is
at least one perspective within which i does not consider that s2 turns
s1 into an ineffective argument.
We assume that ∀s2, s1 ∈ S
∗ : ¬(s2 ⊲∃ s1)⇒ s2 ⋫∃ s1.
We consider that it is possible to query i about the trump relation between
two arguments, and thus obtain information about ⊲∃, to the following limited
extent: i may be presented with two arguments, s1 and s2, and asked whether
he thinks that s2 trumps s1, or s1 trumps s2, or neither. In any case, we
consider that i answers from the perspective he is currently in (to which we
have no other access than through this query). Thus, if i answers that s2
trumps s1, we know that s2 ⊲∃ s1. Indeed, in such a case we know that there
is at least one perspective within which he thinks that s2 trumps s1: namely,
the perspective that he currently has. Conversely, if i answers that s2 does not
trump s1, we know that s2 ⋫∃ s1.6
Remark 1. Whereas the two relations (⊲∃,⋫∃) allow to capture i’s changes of
mind about whether a given argument can undermine another argument, the
simple support relation ↝ adopted here does not permit to capture changes
of mind about whether a given argument supports a given proposition. We
assume that, in practice, when implementing our approach, propositions will
be sufficiently simple and clear, so as to make it safe to assume that i will
not change her mind concerning support during the decision process. This is
a point to which the analyst will have to pay attention when applying our
argument to turn s1 into an ineffective argument. If, on the contrary, i considers that s2
is a plausible argument defending some claim incompatible with s1, but not sufficiently
strong to defeat s1, then we model it by s2 ⋫∃ s1 and s1 ⋫∃ s2. Our choice permits to
reduce our informational requirements, as there are fewer cases to be distinguished (our
framework treats in the same way situations where two arguments trump each other
and situations where none trumps the other). Note however that we do allow for the
possibility that s2 ⊲∃ s1 and s1 ⊲∃ s2: this can happen by i adopting each of those
two attitudes in two different perspectives. Hence, our choice of modelization does not
translate in any formal restriction. This note only serves to make the semantics of the
notion encapsulated by our “trump” relation clear.
6Another way of viewing the relations ⊲∃ and ⋫∃ goes as follows. Given a perspective
p, define ⊲p as a binary relation over S
∗: s2 ⊲p s1 iff, when i is in the perspective p,
s2 turns s1 into an invalid argument. Define P as the set of all possible perspectives.
Then, define ⊲∃ =
⋃
p∈P ⊲p, and s2 ⋫∃ s1 iff ∃p ∈ P | ¬(s2 ⊲p s1). We favor another
presentation because it emphasizes that we consider that we have direct access to ⊲∃
and ⋫∃, rather than to ⊲p.
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approach. If it appears, in real-life implementations, that this assumption is
ill-advised, the framework will have to be extended by applying the approach
used for ⊲∃ to the support relation (this would not raise any specific difficulty).
For the time being, in the absence of empirical reasons to believe that the added
generality is needed, we choose to use a single ↝ relation for simplicity. △
Example 2 (Ranking (cont.)). Consider a set of criteria J . Consider the argu-
ment sb = “Alternative a1 ought to be ranked above a2 because a1 is better
than a2 on three criteria while a2 is better than a1 on only one criterion”, and
sc = “It does not make sense to treat all criteria equally in this problem”.
Then (depending on i’s disposition), it might hold that sc ⊲∃ sb, and it might
hold that sb ↝ ta1≻a2 . Note that both may very well hold together. △
Definition 1 (Decision situation). We denote a decision situation by the tuple
(T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃), with T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃ defined as above.
The part of i’s argumentative disposition that remains stable as i changes
perspectives is of distinctive interest for decision analysis purposes. Indeed,
recall that the emergence of new arguments may lead i to switch perspec-
tive. The stable part of her argumentative disposition is therefore a stance
that proves resistant to the emergence of new arguments and is, in this sense,
argumentatively well-grounded from i’s point of view.
Let us therefore define the corresponding stable relations: ⊲∀ is defined as
s2 ⊲∀ s1 ⇔ ¬(s2 ⋫∃ s1). In plain words, s2 ⊲∀ s1 if and only if there is no
perspective within which s2 does not trump s1, or equivalently, s2 ⊲∀ s1 if
and only if s2 trumps s1 in all perspectives. Relatedly, s2 ⋫∀ s1 is defined as:
s2⋫∀ s1 ⇔ ¬(s2⊲∃ s1). Hence, s2⋫∀ s1 indicates that s2 never trumps s1. This
implies, but is not equivalent to, ¬(s2 ⊲∀ s1).
Example 3 (Ranking (cont.)). Consider alternatives a1 and a2 such that a1
Pareto-dominates a2 on criteria J . Define sd as an argument that states that
a1 ought to be ranked above a2 because of the Pareto-dominance situation
considering criteria in J . Then, it might hold that sd ↝ ta1>a2 . Define sf as
“this is an incorrect reasoning because an important aspect to be considered
in the problem is fairness and a1 is worse than a2 in this respect”. Then it
might be that sf ⊲∃ sd (assuming that i indeed considers fairness as important
and that J does not include fairness). If i later changes her mind about the
importance of fairness, then it will not hold that sf ⊲∀ sd. △
This enables us to define a decisive argument as one that is never trumped
by any argument in S∗.
Definition 2 (Decisive argument). Given a decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,
⋫∃), we say that an argument s ∈ S∗ is decisive iff ∀s′ ∈ S∗: s′ ⋫∀ s.
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weather f. predicts so (s1) ↝ rain tomorrow (t)
weather forecast is often wrong (s2)
⊲∃
weather f. is more often right (s3)
⊲∃
↝complex arg. (s)
Figure 1: Illustration for examples 4 and 5. The symbol under s3 and s indi-
cates a decisive argument.
Notice that decisive arguments can be of very different sorts. Some decisive
arguments will be very simple and straightforward arguments, which are so
simple that they will be accepted by i whatever the perspective. By contrast,
some decisive arguments will be very elaborate ones, taking many aspects of
the topic into account and anticipating all sorts of arguments that could trump
them, and accordingly never trumped by any other argument.
Example 4 (Weather forecast). Assume that individual i holds that t = “it
will rain tomorrow” is supported by the argument s1 = “one can expect that
it will rain tomorrow because weather forecast predicts so”. (See fig. 1.) But
imagine that i also holds, at least from some perspective, that s2 = “weather
forecast is unreliable to infer what the weather will be like tomorrow because
weather forecast is often wrong” is a counter-argument that trumps s1. Imagine
further that i would accept that an argument s3 = “although it is often wrong,
weather forecast is reliable because it is more often right than wrong” trumps
s2. Imagine, finally, that no argument trumps s3 from any perspective.
In such a case, for i, s1 is not a decisive argument. However, one can
elaborate a more complex argument s = “weather forecast predicts that it will
rain tomorrow. This may be an incorrect prediction, but weather forecast is
more often right than wrong, thus its predictions constitute a sufficient basis
to think that it will rain tomorrow”. Notice that s includes the reasonings
given by s1 and s3. Because s anticipates that s2 could be envisaged to trump
it, s could be decisive in supporting t (as assumed in fig. 1). △
2.3. Deliberated judgment
Given a decision situation, we are now in a position to characterize i’s stance
towards the propositions in T once he has considered all the relevant argu-
ments. We say that a proposition is justifiable if it is supported by a decisive
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argument. A proposition is said to be untenable when each argument support-
ing it is always trumped by a decisive argument.
Definition 3 (Justifiable and untenable propositions). Given a decision situ-
ation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃), a proposition t is:
• justifiable iff ∃s ∈ S∗ | s↝ t and ∀s′ : s′ ⋫∀ s;
• untenable iff ∀s ∈ S∗ | s↝ t : ∃sc | sc ⊲∀ s and ∀scc : scc ⋫∀ sc.
Three important aspects of this definition are worth emphazising.
First, we use modal terms to name these notions: we talk about “justifiable”
rather than “justified” propositions. This is because, at a given point of time,
individual i might well fail to accept, as a matter of brute empirical fact, a
proposition supported by a decisive argument, for example, because she does
not know this argument. Similarly, she might accept an untenable proposi-
tion. All this is despite the fact that the decisive arguments referred to in the
definitions of justifiable and untenable propositions are decisive according to
i’s argumentative disposition – that is, by i’s own standards.
Second, notice that, according to our definition, a proposition can’t be both
justifiable and untenable, but it may be neither justifiable nor untenable. This
may be the case if all the arguments supporting t have counter-arguments, but
at least one argument supporting t has no decisive counter-argument.
Lastly, according to our definition, it is possible for a proposition t to be
justifiable and for not-t, or more generally for any proposition t′ in logical con-
tradiction with t or having empirical incompatibilities with t, to be justifiable
too. This specific definition allows to encompass situations in which there are
intrinsically no more reason to accept t than t′. This can happen even when it
is clear and evident for i that t and t′ are incompatible, and even in situations
where this incompatibility between t and t′ is highlighted in some argument
examined during the decision process.7 This is a consequence of our definition
of the trump relation, and it reflects the important idea that, as a matter of
fact, in some decision situations, even if one takes all the relevant arguments
into account, it can happen that several, mutually incompatible propositions
are equally supported. It is part of the very aim of decision-aid, in such situ-
7Relatedly, notice that there is an important asymmetry between the notions of justifiable
and untenable. Because t and some incompatible t′ can both be justifiable, the fact that
t is justifiable does not necessarily imply that the fate of t in i’s view is entirely settled
by its justifiability. By contrast, there is no way an untenable proposition could come
back into the scene.
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ations, to unveil the fact that mutually incompatible propositions are equally
supported.8
Decision situations allowing to classify unambiguously all propositions in
the agenda into justifiable or untenable propositions are of distinctive interest.
Let us term such decision situations “clear-cut”.
Definition 4 (Clear-cut situation). A decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) is
clear-cut iff each proposition in T is either justifiable or untenable.
Given a decision situation, we can now define i’s DJ as those propositions
t ∈ T that are justifiable.
Definition 5 (DJ of i). The Deliberated Judgment corresponding to a decision
situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) is:
Ti = { t ∈ T | t is justifiable } .
This notion of DJ, as we define it, captures what we take to be an important
idea underlying Goodman’s (1983) and Rawls’ (1999) concept of “reflective
equilibrium”. This idea is that, if i manages, through an iterative process of
revision of her opinion through the integration of new elements or arguments,
to reach an “equilibrium” which is stable with respect to the integration of new
elements, then the opinion reached at “equilibrium” is of distinctive interest –
it captures i’s “well-considered” or “true” opinion in some sense.9
Notice that the meaning of this definition depends on the interpretation
given to S∗ (see the beginning of section 2). In the idealistic interpretation,
i’s DJ is unique and fixed once and for all. In the pragmatic interpretation, i’s
DJ may evolve over time, as new arguments emerge.
Example 5 (Weather forecast (cont.)). To explain clearly this definition, it is
useful to come back to our previous example (fig. 1) of individual i who holds
that “weather forecast is often wrong” (s2) is a counter-argument that trumps
“it will rain tomorrow because weather forecast predicts so” (s1). We have seen
that a more complex argument (s), including both “weather forecast predicts
that it will rain tomorrow” and an additional sub-argument that trumps s2,
8Somewhat similar distinctions are discussed in formal argumentation theory about skep-
tical versus credulous justification (Prakken, 2006). Delving into the details of a com-
parative analysis falls beyond the scope of the present article.
9That said, our notion of DJ does not claim to reflect faithfully all the aspects of the
notion of “reflective equilibrium” as used by the authors mentioned above. A thorough
exploration of the links between our formal framework and these philosophical theories
falls beyond the scope of the present article.
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can turn out to be a decisive argument to support “it will rain tomorrow” (t).
In such a case, t belongs to i’s deliberated judgment, despite the fact that
he might claim otherwise if not confronted with the complex argument above.
△
Example 6 (Weather forecast (variant)). In this example T contains two propo-
sitions: t1 is the proposition according to which it will rain tomorrow, and t2
is the contrary proposition. Two corresponding arguments are s1 and s2 – two
weather forecasts from different sources that predict respectively that it will
rain and that it will not. Assuming that i attributes equal credibility to both
sources and considers no other argument to be relevant, he might end up with
both t1 and t2 in his deliberated judgment. This should not be interpreted as
meaning that i is incoherent, but simply as a situation where different propo-
sitions are equally justified for lack of means to tell them apart. Similarly,
scientists can consider two contradictory hypotheses plausible, for lack of cur-
rent knowledge; or someone may hold that two incompatible acts are equally
(im)moral. △
3. Issues of empirical validation
The former section clarified definitions and explained the articulations between
the key concepts of our framework, at a rather abstract level. Now we want to
investigate how this framework can be confronted with empirical reality. For
that purpose, we will examine how one can test a model of the support and
trump relations built by a decision analyst trying to capture the deliberated
judgment of a decision-maker.
Let us define a model η of a decision situation as a pair of relations ↝η ⊆
S∗×T and ⊲η ⊆ S
∗×S∗. These relations are not necessarily an approximation
of the real ↝,⊲∃ relations characterizing i. Indeed, the chief aim of the model
is to know i’s DJ, not to reflect in detail what i thinks about all arguments,
which would arguably not be achievable (we will come back to this important
point below).
Define Tη as the set of propositions that the model η claims are supported:
Tη = ↝η(S
∗) = { t ∈ T | ∃s ∈ S∗ | s↝η t } .
Example 7 (Ranking (cont.)). We have already defined a set of alternatives
A, propositions T representing possible comparisons of the alternatives, and
criteria J . Consider further a set of criteria functions (gj)j∈J evaluating all the
alternatives a ∈ A using real numbers: gj : A → R.
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Imagine that i’s problem is to decide which kind of vegetable to grow in
his backyard. Assume an analyst providing decision-aid to i considers that the
problem can be reduced to a ranking between three candidates: carrots, lettuce
and pumpkins, denoted by c, l, p ∈ A. The analyst believes that i is ready to
rank vegetables according to exactly two criteria. The analyst has obtained
six real numbers gj(a), representing the performances of each alternative on
each criteria, and believes that i is ready to rank vegetables according to the
sum of their performances on the two criteria, v(a) = g1(a) + g2(a).
The analyst can now try to represent i’s attitude using a model η = (↝η,⊲η)
by producing sentences that explain to i the “reasoning” underlying the def-
inition of v. Assume the values given by v position carrots as winners. The
analyst could define an argument s(c,l) “carrots are a better choice than lettuce
because carrots score g1(c) on criterion one, and g2(c) on criterion two, which
gives it a value v(c), whereas lettuce scores g1(l) on criterion one, and g2(l)
on criterion two, which gives it an inferior value v(l)”. In the model of the
analyst, this argument supports the proposition that carrots are ranked higher
than lettuce: s(c,l) ↝η tc≻l. The model contains similar arguments in favor of
other propositions t ∈ T that are in agreement with the values given by v. In
our example, the analyst furthermore believes that no counter-arguments are
necessary and thus defines ⊲η = ∅. △
3.1. Validity and the problem of observability
Because the point of carving out η is to capture i’s Deliberated Judgment Ti,
we can define a valid model as one that correctly captures Ti.
Definition 6 (Validity). A model η is valid iff Tη = Ti.
How can the analyst determine if a given model η is a valid one?
Let us assume that the only information that he can use for that purpose is
the one he can get by querying i – and is, in that sense, “observable” for him.
DJs are not observable in that sense. Indeed, i’s DJ are defined in terms of
⋫∀. But observing ⋫∀ would require that i takes successively all the possible
perspectives she can have, which is unrealistic.10
In the remainder of this section, we explain how we handle this conundrum
in two steps. First, section 3.2 introduces a provisional solution, by identifying
conditions that guarantee the existence of a model allowing to identify i’s DJ
on the basis of what we will call an “operational” validity criterion – that is,
10This would amount to assume that i already knows all the arguments and can aggregate
them successfully. If this were possible, i would probably not need help from an analyst.
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a criterion based on observable data. Then, section 3.3 explores how these
conditions can be weakened.
3.2. Existence of a valid model and its conditions
In this subsection, we introduce apparently reasonable conditions about the
way i reasons and about the decision situation. Our theorem will then guar-
antee that a model exists and captures correctly i’s DJ if those conditions are
satisfied on S∗ and if the model satisfies a validity criterion that, as opposed
to validity itself, can be directly checked on the basis of observable data (an
“operational validity” criterion).
3.2.1. Conditions
A first condition about ⊲∃ mandates a certain form of stability. It assumes
that i possibly changes her mind about whether an argument s′ trumps another
one only when there exists another argument that trumps s′.
Condition 1 (Answerability). A decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) satisfies
Answerability iff, for all pairs of arguments (s, s′):
s′ ⊲∃ s and s
′ ⋫∃ s⇒ ∃sc | sc ⊲∃ s′.
Let us now turn to the second condition. It has to do with the way i
reasons. Imagine that i finds himself in the following uneasy situation. He
declares that s1 is trumped by s2. However, i is also ready to declare that s2
is in turn trumped by s3, a decisive argument. In such a situation, it seems
natural enough to assume that, if we carve out an argument s, playing the same
argumentative role as s1, but anticipating and defeating attempts to trump it
using s2, i will endorse s.
This assumption is formalized by the condition Closed under reinstatement
below. To write it down, we first need to formalize, thanks to the following
notion of replacement, the idea that a set of arguments is at least as powerful
as another argument, from the point of view of its argumentative role. We
say a set of arguments S ⊆ S∗ replaces an argument s ∈ S∗ whenever all the
arguments trumped by s are also trumped by some argument s′ ∈ S, and all
the propositions supported by s are also supported by some argument s′ ∈ S.11
11Note that the replacer may be more powerful than the argument it replaces, in the sense
that it may trump arguments or support propositions than the replaced argument did
not trump or support.
14
Definition 7 (Replacing arguments). A set of arguments S ⊆ S∗ replaces
s ∈ S∗ iff ⊲∃(s) ⊆ ⊲∃(S) and ↝(s) ⊆ ↝(S). We say that s
′ replaces s, with
s, s′ ∈ S∗, to mean that {s′} replaces s.
Condition 2 (Closed under reinstatement). A decision situation (T, S∗,↝,
⊲∃,⋫∃) is closed under reinstatement iff, ∀s1 6= s2 6= s3 6= s1 ∈ S∗ such that
s3 ⊲∀ s2 ⊲∃ s1, with s3 decisive:
∃s | s replaces s1 and ⊲
−1
∃ (s) ⊆ ⊲
−1
∃ (s1) \ {s2}.
The condition mandates that, whenever some decisive argument always
trumps s2, which in turn trumps s1, it is possible to replace s1 by an ar-
gument that is no longer trumped by s2 and is not trumped by any other
argument than those trumping s1.
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Finally, we introduce two conditions on the size of the relation ⊲∃.
Let us call a chain of length k in ⊲∃ a finite sequence si of arguments in
S∗, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that si ⊲∃ si+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. An infinite chain is an
infinite sequence si such that si ⊲∃ si+1 for all i ∈ N.
Condition 3 (Bounded width). A decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) has a
bounded width iff there is no argument that is trumped by an infinite number
of counter-arguments.
Condition 4 (Bounded length). A decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) has a
bounded length iff there is no infinite chain in ⊲∃. (Cycles in ⊲∃ are therefore
excluded as well.)
3.2.2. Operational validity criterion
Let us now define the following “operational” validity criterion for a model η
intended to capture i’s DJ. We term it “operational” to emphasize that, as
opposed to the definition of validity (definition 6), it can be checked on the
sole basis of observable data.
Definition 8 (Operational validity criterion). A model η of a decision sit-
uation is operationally valid iff, whenever (s ↝η t), it holds that [s ↝ t] and
[∀sc ∈ S
∗ : (sc⋫∃ s)∨ (∃scc⊲η sc ∧ scc⊲∃ sc)], and whenever t is not supported
by η, ∀s↝ t : ∃sc ⊲η s ∧ sc ⊲∃ s.
12Such a configuration of arguments, where s3 trumps s2 which in turns trumps s1, recalls
the notion of “strong defense” in argumentation theory (Baroni and Giacomin, 2007). A
further discussion of this issue falls beyond the scope of this paper.
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This criterion amounts to partially comparing, on the one hand, i’s argu-
mentative disposition towards propositions and arguments and, on the other
hand, η’s representations of i’s argumentative disposition.13 More precisely,
a model satisfies the operational validity criterion (for short: is operationally
valid) iff:
(i) arguments that, according to the model, support a proposition t are
indeed considered by i to support t;
(ii) whenever a model uses an argument s to support a proposition, and that
argument is trumped by a counter-argument sc, the model can answer
with a counter-counter-argument, using a counter-counter-argument that
i confirms indeed trumps the counter-argument sc;
(iii) whenever an argument s supports a proposition that the model does not
consider to be supported, the model is able to counter that argument
using a counter-argument that i confirms indeed trumps s.
As required, this criterion is uniquely based on observable data. Indeed,
recall that the only observable data that the analyst can use are the ones
obtained by querying i by asking her if a given argument s2 trumps another
argument s1. If she replies that it does, this is enough to conclude that,
according to her, s2 ⊲∃ s1. Indeed, in such a case, we know that there is at
least one perspective within which she thinks that s2 trumps s1: namely, the
perspective that she currently has. Querying i can thus provide the information
needed to check if a model is operationaly valid.
3.2.3. Theorem
Because querying i will not give enough information to know that s2 ⊲∀ s1 (if
indeed s2 ⊲∀ s1), querying i will never allow to directly claim that a model
satisfies the definition of validity (definition 6). What we need therefore is
a means to ensure that an operationally valid model is a valid one. This is
provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume a decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) is Closed under
reinstatement, Answerable and has Bounded length and width. Then: i) the
decision situation is clear-cut; ii) there exists an operationally valid model of
that decision situation; iii) any operationally valid model η satisfies Ti = Tη.
13This procedure could be considered as a persuasion dialogue (Prakken, 2009).
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Theorem 2 (in section 3.3) generalizes this theorem. It is proven in ap-
pendix A.
Example 8 (Budget reform). Let us take a non trivial example that will be used
to illustrate how theorem 1 can be used and why we need to go beyond this first
theorem. Imagine that i is a political decision-maker. She wants to run for an
election, and is elaborating her policy agenda. She has heard about Meinard
et al.’s (2017) (thereafter referred to as “M”) argument that, according to a
popular survey, biodiversity should be ranked after retirement schemes and
public transportation, but before relations with foreign countries, order and
security, and culture and leisure in the expenses of the State. Assume that i
wants to make up her mind about the single proposition t = “I should include
in my agenda a reform to increase public spending on biodiversity conservation
so as to rank biodiversity higher than relations with foreign countries in the
State budget”.
She requests the help of a decision analyst. The latter starts by reviewing
the literature to identify a set of arguments with which he will work. (The
arguments are illustrated in fig. 2.) He thereby identifies that proposition t can
be considered to be supported by s = “M’s finding (stated above) is based on a
large scale survey and quantitative statistical analysis, and their protocol was
designed to track the preferences that citizens express in popular votes. There
are therefore scientific reasons to think that a policy package including the
corresponding reform will gather support among voters.” Pursuing his explo-
ration of the recent economic literature on environmental valuation methods,
the analyst could identify only two counter-arguments to s:
• sc1 = “M’s measure is extremely rough as compared to more classical eco-
nomic valuations, such as contingent valuations and the like (Kontoleon
et al., 2007), which makes it non credible as a guide for policy”;
• sc2 = “M claim to value biodiversity per se. The very meaning of such
an endeavor is questionable because it is too abstract. More classical
economic valuations are focused on concrete objects and projects, which
is more promising”.
But he also found a counter-counter-argument to each of these counter-
arguments:
• sc1c = “Biodiversity is not the kind of thing about which people make
decisions in their everyday life. Their preferences about it are accordingly
likely to be rough. The exceedingly precise measurements provided by
contingent valuations and the like are therefore more a weakness than a
strength”;
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will gather support (s) ↝η increase spendings (t)
rough measure (sc1) abstract (sc2)
⊲η
⊲η
inherent (sc1c)
⊲η
important (sc2c)
⊲η
Figure 2: Illustration for example 8. (Only the arguments used by the model
η are displayed.)
• sc2c = “Abstract notions such as biodiversity are an important deter-
mining factor for many people when they make decisions. Eschewing to
value them is ill-founded”.
Imagine further that the analyst has not found any argument liable to trump
either sc1c or sc2c.
Define s1,reinstated as: “[content of s]; this is a rough measure but [content
of sc1c]”; similarly, define s2,reinstated as “[content of s]; the very meaning could
be questioned because it is highly abstract, but [content of sc2c]”; and define
sreinstated as “[content of s]; this is a rough measure but [content of sc1c]; the
very meaning could be questioned because it is highly abstract, but [content
of sc2c]”. Define S ⊆ S
∗ as the set of argument comprising s, sc1, sc2, sc1c, sc2c,
s1,reinstated, s2,reinstated and sreinstated.
Assume that the analyst is justified to think that i’s reasoning is such that
S∗ satisfies Closed under reinstatement, Answerability, Bounded length and
Bounded width. Recall now that, in order to identify the propositions lying
in Ti, the analyst must identify arguments supporting propositions in Ti, such
that these arguments can resist counter-arguments from the whole of S∗. In
other words, the analyst must test the claims of the model not only against
the counter-arguments in S, but against the whole of S∗, which the analyst
ignores.
Imagine now that the analyst assumes that, even though S is a strict subset
of S∗, S is a good enough approximation of S∗, in the sense that there is no
argument in S∗ \S that trumps any argument in S or that supports t. Thanks
to theorem 1, the analyst can then deduce that the situation is clear-cut and
that there exists a valid model of the decision situation.
The next step for him is to carve out a model η reproducing the relations
between arguments that he found in the literature, and then to test whether
his model is operationally valid using definition 8. In order to validate η, he
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would first ask i whether she agrees that s supports t. If so, he then would
check whether i considers that sc1 is a counter-argument to s, in which case
the analyst would check that the counter-counter-argument that he envisaged,
sc1c, is considered by i to trump sc1. The analyst would then proceed in a
similar way with the second chain of counter-arguments (sc2 and sc2c), and
verify that, as η hypothesizes, i does not take any other argument in S to
trump s. This would, eventually, allow him to conclude on the validity of the
model η. Should it prove operationally valid, the analyst could then conclude
that Ti = {t} (using theorem 1 and Tη = {t}).
But notice that this whole story only works because we assumed that argu-
ments in S∗ \ S never trump any argument in S. This assumption is clearly
unrealistic: any slight reformulation of sc1, for example, will most likely also
trump s. This is not the only unrealistic assumption in our hypothetical sce-
nario: it is also unlikely that the whole set S∗ indeed satisfies Bounded length,
for example. This condition requires an absence of cycle in the trump relation.
While this may be considered to hold on S, it is possible that some ambiguous
or poorly phrased arguments in S∗ would confuse i in such a way that i will
declare, for example, that s1 ⊲∃ s2 ⊲∃ s3 ⊲∃ s1 for some triple of such unclear
arguments. Hence the need to go beyond theorem 1. △
Theorem 1 embodies an important step towards being able to confront mod-
els of deliberated judgment with empirical reality, by spelling out sufficient
conditions upon which unrolling the procedures of refutation is not a pure
waste of time and energy, because there is something to be found. It also il-
lustrates the potential usefulness of the notion of operational validity. Indeed,
since the point of the modeling endeavor in our context is to capture Ti, we
know by virtue of iii) in theorem 1 that, if the corresponding conditions are
met, and if we have good reasons to believe that we have an operationally valid
model, then we can admit that it captures Ti.
However, establishing this theorem cannot be more than just a first step.
As illustrated in example 8, the conditions above are quite heroic. One cannot
realistically expect that real-life decision situations will fulfill these conditions.
The most important issue is that we need a means to distinguish S∗ from the
restricted set of arguments with which the analyst works in practice. And we
need means to make sure that the restricted set indeed “covers” the matter
“sufficiently”, so as to escape the situation in which the analyst is locked
in example 8, where he finds himself condemned to make wildly unrealistic
assumptions. The next subsection tackles this pivotal issue.
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3.3. Weakening of some conditions
To obtain the results we want, all we actually need is that it should be possible
to define a subset of arguments Sγ ⊆ S
∗ that satisfies conditions akin to the
ones defined above, and which are sufficient to cover the topic at hand.
Let us start by formalizing the requirement, for Sγ, to cover the topic at
hand. What we want is that all the arguments needed for the decision-maker
to make up her mind about the topic should be encapsulated in Sγ. This means
that, if arguments from s ∈ S∗ \ Sγ are brought to bear, it should be possible
either to discard them or to show that they can be replaced by arguments in
Sγ.
This is done thanks to the following formal definitions and condition.
Definition 9 (Unnecessary argument). Given a decision situation and a subset
Sγ ⊆ S
∗ of arguments, we say that S ⊆ S∗ essentially replaces s ∈ S∗ iff
(⊲∃(s) ∩ Sγ) ⊆ ⊲∃(S) and ↝(s) ⊆ ↝(S).
Let Sγdec = Sγ ∩ ⊲∃(S∗) denote the decisive arguments in Sγ. We say that
an argument s ∈ S∗ is resistant iff it is not trumped by any argument in Sγdec.
Let Sγres = Sγ ∩⊲∃(Sγdec) denote the resistant arguments in Sγ.
We say that an argument s ∈ S∗ is unnecessary iff s is trumped by a resistant
argument from Sγ or s is essentially replaceable by Sγres. In formal terms:
s ∈ ⊲∃(Sγres) or [(⊲∃(s) ∩ Sγ) ⊆ ⊲∃(Sγres) and ↝(s) ⊆ ↝(Sγres)].
Condition 5 (Covering set of arguments). Given a decision situation and a
set of arguments Sγ ⊆ S
∗, Sγ is covering iff all arguments s ∈ S
∗ \ Sγ are
unnecessary.
Let us now relax the conditions of theorem 1 by formulating weaker re-
quirements confined to Sγ. This adaptation is straightforward for conditions 1
and 2.
Condition 6 (Set of arguments allowing answerability). Given a decision
situation and a subset Sγ ⊆ S
∗ of arguments, we say that the set Sγ satisfies
Answerability iff, for all s ∈ S∗, s′ ∈ Sγ: s
′
⊲∃ s and s
′⋫∃ s⇒ ∃sc ∈ S∗ | sc⊲∃
s′.
Condition 7 (Set of arguments closed under reinstatement). Given a decision
situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) and a subset Sγ ⊆ S∗ of arguments, we say that the
set Sγ is closed under reinstatement iff, ∀s1, s3 ∈ Sγ , s1 6= s3, s3 not trumping
s1, s3 decisive:
∃s ∈ Sγ | s replaces s1 and ⊲
−1
∃ (s) ⊆ ⊲
−1
∃ (s1) \⊲∀(s3).
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This condition is vacuous when there is no s2 such that s3 ⊲∃ s2 ⊲∃ s1: in
that case, s1 replaces itself.
Similarly, we can relax condition 3 and apply it to a subset of arguments.
When an argument has very numerous counter-arguments, one may think that
their vast number might spring from some common reasoning that they share.
For example, an argument might involve some real value as part of its rea-
soning, and be multiplied as infinitely many similar arguments of the same
kind using tiny variations of that real value. If so, and if we know that we
can convincingly rebut each of these counter-arguments, we might believe that
only a small number of counter-counter-arguments will suffice to rebut the
counter-arguments.
Definition 10 (Defense). We say s ∈ S∗ is Sγ-defended iff all the arguments
sc trumping s are trumped by a decisive argument in Sγ, or formally, ∀sc ∈
S∗ | sc ⊲∃ s : (∃scc ∈ Sγ | scc ⊲∀ sc, scc decisive). We say s ∈ S
∗ is (j, Sγ)-
defended iff there exists a set S ⊆ Sγ of arguments of cardinality at most j
such that s is S-defended (thus, if j arguments from Sγ suffice to defend s).
Condition 8 (Set of arguments with width bounded by j). Given a decision
situation and a natural number j, a set of arguments Sγ ⊆ S
∗ has width
bounded by j iff, for each argument s ∈ Sγ, if s is Sγ-defended, then it is
(j, Sγ)-defended.
The condition is vacuously true when no argument in S∗ is trumped by more
than j counter-arguments.
Our last condition relaxes condition 4. We want to exclude some of the long
chains in S∗. But we want to tolerate long chains, including cycles, among
unclear arguments. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from ordinary argumentation
situations suggests that in many (otherwise interesting) decision situations,
cycles do appear in trump relations among arguments (for example, because
arguments can use ambiguous terms). However, this does not necessarily pre-
vent the situation from being modelizable in our sense. What we do need is
to avoid some of the cycles or chains that involve “too many” arguments from
Sγ, in a somewhat technical sense captured by the following condition.
Condition 9 (Set of arguments with length bounded by k). Given a decision
situation, a natural number k, and a set of arguments Sγ, define a binary
relation Q over Sγ as s2Qs1 iff s2⊲∃ s1 or s2⊲∃ s⊲∃ s1 for some s ∈ S
∗, thus,
Q = (⊲∃∪(⊲∃◦⊲∃))∩(Sγ×Sγ). Let Q
1 = Q and Qk+1 = Qk◦Q for any natural
number k. The set Sγ has length bounded by k iff ∄s2, s1 ∈ Sγ | s2Qk+1s1, thus,
iff it is impossible to reach an argument from Sγ, starting from an argument
from Sγ, following Q more than k times.
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This condition tolerates cycles14 in ⊲∃ that involve only arguments picked
outside the chosen set Sγ. It only forbids a subset of the situations where
a cycle (or a too long chain) is built that involve arguments from Sγ. For
example, it excludes a situation where s2 ⊲∃ s⊲∃ s1 ⊲∃ s2 for some s1, s2 ∈ Sγ
and s /∈ Sγ .
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Thanks to conditions 5 to 9, we are now in a position to define our set of
arguments of interest.
Definition 11 (CAC arguments). Given a decision situation and a set Sγ ⊆
S∗, we say that Sγ is clear and covering, or CAC, iff it is Closed under re-
instatement and Answerable, and has width bounded by some number j and
length bounded by some number k, and is such that all arguments s ∈ S∗ \ Sγ
are unnecessary.
Following the same rationale, we can define an operational criterion echoing
definition 8.
Definition 12 (Sγ-operational validity). Given a decision situation and a
set Sγ ⊆ S
∗, we define a model η as Sγ-operationally valid iff for all (s↝η t),
s ∈ S∗, we have [s↝t] and [∀sc ∈ Sγ : (sc⋫∃s)∨(∃scc ∈ S∗ | scc⊲ηsc∧scc⊲∃sc)],
and when t is not supported by η, ∀s ∈ Sγ | s↝ t : (∃sc ∈ S
∗ | sc⊲η s∧sc⊲∃ s).
A theorem echoing theorem 1 can then be proved.
14Cycles in our sense have to be distinguished from cycles involving an attack relation
as defined in formal argumentation theory. We do not deny that cycles of attacks in
the formal argumentation sense often happen, and condition 9 does not exclude cycles
understood in that sense: these cycles are generally not cycles in “trump” relations.
We consider that an argument s2 trumps another one only when i considers that the
first one is strong enough to render the second one ineffective. This definition relies on
an asymmetry, s2 being, in a sense, “favored over” s1. Our trump relation is therefore
somewhat analogical to a strict preference relation, for which an assumption of acyclicity
is commonplace in the literature.
15Readers used to decision theoretic axiomatizations might find this condition odd, since
axioms usually mandate conditions considered more “basic”, such as transitivity and
irreflexivity, and derive from them the conclusion that cycles are forbidden. This strategy
does not work for our setting (or is not applicable in a simple way), because “basic”
conditions such as transitivity would be unreasonable to impose here. For example, given
s3 ⊲∃ s2 and s2 ⊲∃ s1, it is easy to think about situations where i would consider that
s3⋫∀s1, and to think about situations where i would consider that s3⊲∃s1. Neither anti-
transitivity nor transitivity can thus be reasonably imposed (and our current condition
avoids such requirements). Studying which conditions exactly are necessary to ban cycles
(or make them innocuous) in our setting would be interesting, but it does not seem crucial
at this stage. Indeed, in concrete settings we consider that cycles involving arguments
from Sγ are unlikely to occur. (This claim should be backed up by empirical studies.)
22
Theorem 2. Given a decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃), given Sγ ⊆ S∗, if
Sγ is CAC, then i) the decision situation is clear-cut; ii) there exists an Sγ-
operationally valid model η; iii) any Sγ-operationally valid model η satisfies
Ti = Tη.
This theorem is a strengthened version of theorem 1 since it produces the
same results based i) on the conditions encapsulated in the definition of CAC
arguments, and ii) on Sγ-operational validity. Those conditions are implied
by the ones assumed by theorem 1. Indeed, when the conditions of theorem 1
hold, taking Sγ = S
∗ satisfies the conditions of theorem 2.16
4. Significance of the deliberated judgment
framework for decision theory and the practice
of decision analysis
Section 2 displayed the conceptual core of our framework and section 3 ex-
plained how this framework can be confronted to empirical reality. The present
section reflects on the meaning, promises and limits of our approach. We start
by pondering on how the various conditions spelled out in section 3 can be
interpreted (section 4.1). We then take a broader view to discuss how our
framework relates to the larger literature in decision science (section 4.2).
4.1. The meaning of our conditions
In order to understand the precise meaning of the conditions of theorem 1
and, more importantly, of theorem 2, an almost trivial but nonetheless very
important first step is to spell out what it means if these conditions are not
fulfilled.
We already stressed that the conditions of theorem 1 are certainly too strong
to be fulfilled. The conditions of theorem 2 are, by construction, much weaker.
16Theorem 2 has an interesting corollary which permits to view our proposal as providing
useful means to take account of the fact that knowledge evolves. In some cases it might
be important, for example for efficiency reasons in contexts of limited resources, to
investigate if a decision-aid provided before some discovery of new knowledge is still valid
after the discovery. Take a decison-aid which has been provided using a set of argument
Sγ which is CAC with respect to the set of known arguments before the discovery S
∗
before
and using a Sγ-operationally valid model η. Theorem 2 shows that, if we can prove that
Sγ is CAC with respect to the set of all the arguments S
∗
after
supplemented thanks to
the new discovery, then there is no need to check the validity of η again. We thank an
anonymous reviewer for this observation.
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But still, there certainly are situations where they are not fulfilled. In such
cases, we do not claim that decision analysis is impossible. Neither is our
general framework, as presented in section 2, rendered bogus. The sole im-
plication is that our approach to operational empirical validation cannot be
implemented. This does not prevent, for example, the analyst from trying
to identify directly decisive arguments, and this does not render irrelevant a
decision analysis based on decisive arguments. Neither does this prevent com-
pletely other approaches to decision analysis to be implemented. The only
implication is that a full-fledged implementation of our approach, including
operational empirical validation, is not guaranteed to be possible in such sit-
uations. It is no part of our claim that our approach can be applied all the
time and provides an all-encompassing framework liable to overcome all other
approaches to decision analysis. Our approach has a specific domain of appli-
cation.
Beyond these simple, negative comments, how are our conditions to be un-
derstood? In general terms, these various conditions can be interpreted in
three different ways:
(i) as axioms capturing minimal properties concerning arguments and the
way i reasons,
(ii) as empirical hypotheses,
(iii) as rules governing the decision process (rules that i can commit to abide
by, or can consider to be well-founded safeguards for the proper unfolding
of the process).
Example 9 (Budget reform (cont.)). We can now improve example 8 by relaxing
the assumptions it contains. One can envisage in turn the three possibilities
spelled out above.
In interpretation (i), instead of assuming that i always reasons in such a way
that S∗ in its entirety satisfies the conditions of theorem 1, we only assume
that the set of argument S = {s, sc1, sc2, sc1c, sc2c, s1,reinstated, s2,reinstated,
sreinstated} is CAC.
In interpretation (ii), we have to take advantage of empirical data to claim
that the above set is CAC. Imagine, for example, that we have been able
to show that the overwhelming majority of people does reason with respect
to the arguments in this set in such a way that it can be considered CAC.
This would provide strong empirical support to admit that this set can be
considered CAC for the purpose of the decision process at issue (assuming
the pragmatic interpretation of S∗). In the present article, we leave aside the
important difficulties that such empirical concrete applications would face.
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In interpretation (iii), the analyst would start by explaining to i the content
of the requirements encapsulated in the definition of a CAC set of arguments
and ask her if she is willing to commit herself to reason in such a way as to
fullfill these requirements when thinking about the arguments to be discussed
in the process. For example, for the Answerability of the set of arguments
(condition 6), the analyst would ask i if she would accept to commit not
to change her mind depending on her mood or any other non-argumentative
factor. Notice that i might figure at some point that it was not a good idea
after all to commit to these various things, and in such a case the decision
analysis process would fail. △
Some of the conditions of our theorems are arguably more congenial to a
given interpretation. For example, it seems natural enough to interpret con-
dition 2 as a rationality requirement of the kind that it makes sense to use as
an axiom (interpretation (i)). By contrast, condition 1 is the kind of condition
that can easily be translated in the form of rules than decision-makers can
be asked to abide by when they engage in a decision process (interpretation
(iii)). By construction, conditions 6 and 7 are weakened versions of the above
stronger conditions. They accordingly inherit the preferred interpretation sug-
gested above. Conditions 8 and 9 can easily be seen as empirical hypotheses
(interpretation (ii)).
However, although it is tempting to draw such connections between spe-
cific conditions and specific interpretations, at a more abstract level all the
conditions above can be interpreted in all three interpretations. The different
conditions can even be interpreted differently in the context of different im-
plementations. In the present, largely theoretical work, we want to leave all
these possibilities open. Future, more applied works, should assess if and when
these different interpretations can be used, in particular by elaborating and
implementing the convenient empirical validation protocols in interpretation
(ii) and the convenient participatory procedures in interpretation (iii).
4.2. The deliberated judgment framework in perspective
Now that the meaning of the conditions of our theorems is clarified, we are in
a firmer position to discuss the nature of our contribution to the literature.
The central, distinctive concept of our approach is the one of deliberated
judgments of an individual. Deliberated judgments are the propositions that
the individual herself considers based on decisive arguments, on due consider-
ation. This formulation highlights the two key features of the concept.
The first key feature is that deliberated judgments are the result of a careful
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examination of arguments and counter-arguments. This echoes the approach
to the notion of rationality developed most prominently by Habermas (1981).
In this approach, actions, attitudes or utterances can be termed “rational” so
long as the actor(s) performing or having them can account for them, explain
them and use arguments and counter-arguments to withstand criticisms that
other people could raise against them. Variants of this vision of rationality
play a key role in other prominent philosophical frameworks, such as Scanlon’s
(2000) and Sen’s (2009). Having in mind this approach to rationality, in the
remainder of this discussion, we will therefore simply talk about “rationality”
when referring to this first idea underlying our framework.
The second key feature is that deliberated judgments are nevertheless the
individual’s own judgments, in the sense that they do not reflect the applica-
tion of any exogenous criterion. This second idea can also be nicknamed, for
brevity’s stake, by simply talking about “non-paternalism”.
Our approach, when applied in a decision analysis perspective, requires ad-
mitting the soundness of these two normative notions of rationality and non-
paternalism.
Our approach however also has a strong descriptive dimension, which is a
direct implication of the very meaning of non-paternalism. Though we are
interested in deliberated judgments rather than in the “shallow” preferences
that individual spontaneously express, still the deliberated judgments that
we are interested in are the ones of real, empirical individuals that are not
constrained by our framework to adhere to a specific set of exogeneous stances.
These descriptive aspects feed a normative approach that accordingly owes its
normative credentials both to its normative foundations and to its reference
to empirical reality.
Due to this double anchorage in normative and descriptive aspects, our ap-
proach opens avenues to overcome perennial difficulties facing decision theory
concerning its descriptive vs. normative status. Indeed, our framework sets the
stage for decision-aiding practices that could have a crucial strength as com-
pared with more standard approaches, by including rigorous tests of whether
individuals endorse or not various arguments and argumentative lines, thereby
avoiding both actively advocating them (a purely normative approach) and
leaving the individual in the ignorance of their existence (a purely descriptive
approach). Decision analyses based on deliberated judgments thereby pro-
vide compelling reasons for the aided individual to think that the decisions he
makes once he has been aided are better than the one he would have made
otherwise. Such reasons are liable to play a key role in strengthening the le-
gitimacy and validity of decision analysis – two requirements largely discussed
in the literature (Landry et al., 1983, 1996).
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In order to illustrate this idea, it is useful to compare our framework to more
classical approches, such as utility theory. Proponents of utility theory could
claim that utility functions provide arguments that individuals will consider
convincing (Savage, 1972; Morgenstern, 1979; Raiffa, 1985), and that therefore
our approach will converge towards utility theory. However, the convincing
power of utility-based arguments is debatable (Ellsberg, 1961; Allais, 1979).
Psychologists have tried to test it experimentally (Slovic and Tversky, 1974;
MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979). But such tests can hardly be considered
conclusive: the meaning of their results depends on how arguments have been
presented to the individuals and on whether counter-arguments have been pre-
sented, as Slovic and Tversky (1974) themselves point out. Such a systematic
confrontation with counter-arguments is precisely what our proposed frame-
work allows to implement.
The formal framework presented in this article will however only live up to
its promises if empirical applications are developed. Researchers in artificial
intelligence (Labreuche, 2011) and persuasion (Carenini and Moore, 2006) have
produced ways of “translating” formal Multi-Attribute Value Theory models
into textual arguments, that could possibly provide promising tools to develop
such applications.
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A. Proofs, and additional explanatory results
Our main goal in this section is to prove theorem 2. We do this by first proving
that if a set Sγ is CAC, then it includes enough decisive arguments to settle the
issue (we will call such a set S ⊆ S∗ efficient). This requires a few intermediate
lemmas. Efficiency will bring a number of consequences of interest to us, among
which theorem 2. As a second goal, we want to give some further results that
help understand the relationship between the notions of clear-cut, validity and
operational validity, existence of a CAC set of arguments, and efficiency.
Let us start with the formal definition of efficiency.
Definition 13 (Efficiency). Given a decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) and
S ⊆ S∗, S is efficient iff Ti = ↝(S ∩ ⊲∃(S∗)), and t /∈ Ti ⇔ ↝
−1(t) ⊆
⊲∀(S ∩⊲∃(S∗)).
Recall that ⊲∃(S∗) designates the arguments not trumped by any argument,
thus, the decisive arguments, and hence, ⊲∀(S ∩⊲∃(S∗)) designates the argu-
ments always trumped by some decisive argument in S.
In all this section, we assume we are given a decision situation (T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,
⋫∃) and a subset of arguments Sγ ⊆ S∗ (except in theorem 5).
Our strategy for proving that CAC implies efficiency, roughly speaking, in-
volves excluding “undecided” situations from Sγ . For example, we want to
show that it is impossible that an argument has no decisive argument trump-
ing it in Sγ, but also fails to be defended in Sγ. We will do this by progressively
promoting or degrading arguments, e.g., show that, in Sγ, if an argument is
resistant (has no argument that decisively trumps it), then it must also be
defended, and if it is defended, it must be replaceable by decisive arguments.
Define Sγdec = Sγ ∩⊲∃(S∗) as the decisive arguments from Sγ.
Define an argument s as finitely defended iff some finite set of arguments
from Sγdec defends it, thus, iff ∃S ⊆ Sγdec such that ⊲
−1
∃ (s) ⊆ ⊲∃(S), S finite.
Define Sγdef as the arguments from Sγ that are finitely defended.
Define Rγdec ⊆ S
∗ as the arguments that are replaceable by Sγdec. Recall
that S replaces s iff ⊲∃(s) ⊆ ⊲∃(S) and ↝(s) ⊆ ↝(S).
Define Sγres = Sγ ∩ ⊲∃(Sγdec) as the resistant arguments from Sγ, namely,
those not trumped by any argument from Sγdec.
Define Eγres ⊆ S
∗ as the arguments that are essentially replaceable by Sγres.
Recall that S essentially replaces s iff (⊲∃(s)∩Sγ) ⊆ ⊲∃(S) and ↝(s) ⊆ ↝(S).
Similarly, Eγdec are the arguments essentially replaceable by Sγdec.
Lemma 1 (Sγdef ⊆ Rγdec). If Sγ is Closed under reinstatement and Answer-
able, then the arguments from Sγ that are finitely defended are replaceable by
decisive arguments from Sγ; formally: Sγdef ⊆ Rγdec.
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Proof. The strategy for this proof is the following. If s ∈ Sγdef, some finite set
of arguments defends s. We wish to pick defenders one by one, replacing s by
applying Closed under reinstatement to s and the chosen defender, obtaining
an argument that fewer arguments trump, and then show that iterating the
process yields a decisive argument replacing s.
We need the following intermediate result. Assume a set of arguments S ⊆
Sγdec is given, together with an argument s1 ∈ S and an argument s
r
1 ∈ Sγ
defended by S. Then, there exists an argument sr2 ∈ Sγ replacing s
r
1 and
defended by S \ {s1}.
Indeed, from Answerability, because s1 ∈ Sγdec, ⊲∃(s1) = ⊲∀(s1). Also, as
s1 ∈ Sγdec, we can assume that s1 6= s
r
1, otherwise s
r
1 ∈ Sγdec and the result
is obtained by taking sr2 = s
r
1. And s1 does not trump s
r
1, otherwise s
r
1 is
trumped by a decisive argument and thus not defended. We can thus apply
Closed under reinstatement to (s1, s
r
1). We obtain that for some s
r
2 ∈ Sγ, s
r
2
replaces sr1 and ⊲
−1
∃ (s
r
2) ⊆ ⊲
−1
∃ (s
r
1) \ ⊲∃(s1). Thus, S \ {s1} defends s
r
2: any
argument trumping sr2 already trumped s
r
1, hence, is trumped by S (because
that set defends sr1), and is not trumped by s1. This proves our intermediate
result.
Coming back to the main point, we know that a finite coalition S ⊆ Sγdec
defends s ∈ Sγ . Define s
r
1 = s and apply the intermediate result repetitively to
obtain an argument sr2 ∈ Sγ replacing s and defended by S minus one element,
then sr3 ∈ Sγ replacing s
r
2, thus, replacing s (because replacement is transitive)
and defended by S minus two elements, and so on, until obtaining a replacer
defended by ∅, thus, decisive.
Lemma 2 (S∗ = Eγres ∪ ⊲∃(Sγres)). If Sγ is covering, any argument is ei-
ther essentially replaceable by Sγres, or attacked by an argument from Sγres;
formally: S∗ = Eγres ∪⊲∃(Sγres).
Proof. We consider in turn three sets whose union yields S∗: Sγ , Sγ∩⊲∃(Sγdec)
and Sγ ∩⊲∃(Sγdec).
First, Sγ ⊆ Eγres ∪⊲∃(Sγres): from covering, if s /∈ Sγ , s is unnecessary, and
by definition, s is unnecessary iff s ∈ Eγres or s ∈ ⊲∃(Sγres).
Second, Sγ ∩⊲∃(Sγdec) ⊆ ⊲∃(Sγdec) ⊆ ⊲∃(Sγres), because Sγdec ⊆ Sγres.
Third, Sγ ∩⊲∃(Sγdec) ⊆ Eγres, because Sγ ∩⊲∃(Sγdec) = Sγres by definition.
We have considered all three possible cases, and the conclusion obtains in
all cases.
Lemma 3 (Sγres ⊆ Sγdef). If Sγ is CAC, any argument in Sγ that has no
argument that decisively trumps it is finitely defended; formally: Sγres ⊆ Sγdef.
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Proof. Recall that the relation Q is defined in Bounded length (condition 9) as
Q = (⊲∃∪ (⊲∃ ◦⊲∃))∩ (Sγ×Sγ). Observe that, given any set S 6= ∅, Bounded
Length forbids that ∀s ∈ S : S ∩ Q−1(s) 6= ∅. Otherwise, applying Q−1 to an
element of S would always yield some element in S, and Q−1 could then be
applied any desired number of times starting from any s ∈ S, thereby building
a chain as long as desired. Accordingly, for any set S, Bounded Length imposes
that if ∀s ∈ S : S ∩Q−1(s) 6= ∅, then S = ∅.
Define S = Sγres ∩ Sγdef. We show that, given any s ∈ S, S ∩ Q
−1(s) 6= ∅.
This suffices to obtain S = ∅ and, therefore, our desired conclusion.
Pick any s ∈ S. Towards exhibiting an argument in S∩Q−1(s), we want first
to exhibit some argument s′ that is a) trumped by some argument s∗ ∈ Sγres,
thus s′ ∈ ⊲∃(Sγres); b) not trumped by any argument in Sγdec, thus s
′ /∈
⊲∃(Sγdec); c) equal to s or trumping s. As a second step, from the existence
of such an s′ we will then prove that s∗, the particular trumping argument
in part a), belongs to S (thanks to parts a) and b)), and belongs to Q−1(s)
(thanks to part c)).
Our first step thus amounts to show that some s′ satisfies our three condi-
tions above.
From s /∈ Sγdef and s ∈ Sγ, we know that s is not finitely defended, and using
the contrapositive of Bounded width, we obtain that s is not infinitely defended
either. Hence, by definition of defense, there exists some s1 ∈ ⊲∃(Sγdec) ∩
⊲
−1
∃ (s). And, applying [S
∗ = Eγres ∪ ⊲∃(Sγres)], either s1 ∈ Eγres, or s1 ∈
⊲∃(Sγres).
If s1 ∈ Eγres, s ∈ ⊲∃(Sγres). Besides, because s ∈ S, s ∈ Sγres. Thus taking
s′ = s satisfies our three conditions.
And if s1 ∈ ⊲∃(Sγres), because s1 ∈ ⊲∃(Sγdec)), taking s
′ = s1 satisfies our
three conditions.
For our second step, consider an argument s∗ ∈ Sγres that trumps s
′ (we
know this is possible thanks to part a)). Thanks to part b), we know that s′
is not trumped by any argument in Sγdec, and from [Sγdef ⊆ Rγdec], we know
that if s′ was trumped by an argument in Sγdef, it would be trumped by an
argument in Sγdec, thus, s
′ is not trumped by any argument in Sγdef. Because
s∗⊲∃ s
′, we know that s∗ /∈ Sγdef. Thus, s
∗ ∈ S. Finally, s∗⊲∃ s or s
∗
⊲∃ s
′
⊲∃ s
(thanks to part c)), thus, s∗ ∈ Q−1(s).
Lemma 4 (S∗ = Eγdec ∪ ⊲∃(Sγdec)). If Sγ is CAC, any argument is either
essentially replaceable by decisive arguments from Sγ, or attacked by a decisive
argument from Sγ; formally: S
∗ = Eγdec ∪⊲∃(Sγdec).
Proof. This follows from [S∗ = Eγres ∪ ⊲∃(Sγres)], [Sγres ⊆ Sγdef] and [Sγdef ⊆
Rγdec].
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Theorem 3 (CAC implies efficiency). If Sγ is CAC, Sγ is efficient.
Proof. We prove that ↝(Eγdec) ⊆ ↝(Sγdec) ⊆ Ti ⊆ ↝(⊲∀(Sγdec)) ⊆ ↝(Eγdec).
This proves the point, as it shows that
i. Ti = ↝(Sγdec), and
ii. t /∈ Ti ⇔ ↝
−1(t) ⊆ ⊲∀(Sγdec), because Ti = ↝(⊲∀(Sγdec)).
That ↝(Eγdec) ⊆ ↝(Sγdec) ⊆ Ti follows from the definitions of Eγdec and Ti.
The next subset relation holds because if some decisive argument supports
t, that argument is not in ⊲∀(Sγdec).
Finally, Answerability mandates that ⊲∃(Sγdec) ⊆ ⊲∀(Sγdec), from which
it follows that ⊲∀(Sγdec) ⊆ ⊲∃(Sγdec), and using [S
∗ = Eγdec ∪ ⊲∃(Sγdec)],
⊲∃(Sγdec) ⊆ Eγdec.
Theorem 4 (Validity of η). Assume Sγ is efficient and η, a model of the
decision situation, is Sγ-operationally valid. Then Ti = Tη.
Proof. Recall that a model is Sγ-operationally valid iff for all (s↝η t), s ∈ S
∗,
we have [s↝ t] and [∀sc ∈ Sγ : (sc⋫∃ s)∨ (∃scc ∈ S∗ | scc⊲η sc∧scc⊲∃ sc)], and
when t is not supported by η, ∀s ∈ Sγ | s↝ t : (∃sc ∈ S
∗ | sc ⊲η s ∧ sc ⊲∃ s).
Consider t ∈ Tη. By definition, some s↝η t. From operational validity of η,
we obtain that s↝ t and ∀sc ⊲∀ s : sc /∈ Sγ ∩⊲
−1
∃ (S
∗) (because [sc ⊲∀ s ∧ sc ∈
Sγ] ⇒ sc ∈ ⊲
−1
∃ (S
∗)). Hence, s /∈ ⊲∀(Sγ ∩ ⊲
−1
∃ (S
∗)), thus ↝−1(t) * ⊲∀(Sγ ∩
⊲
−1
∃ (S
∗)). Efficiency of Sγ brings t ∈ Ti.
If t /∈ Tη, from operational validity of η, no decisive argument in Sγ may
support t, equivalently, t /∈ ↝(Sγ ∩⊲∃(S∗)), and from efficiency, t /∈ Ti.
We can now prove theorem 2.
Proof of theorem 2. From [CAC implies efficiency], we obtain that Sγ is effi-
cient. It then follows from the efficiency of Sγ that the decision situation is
clear-cut and that a Sγ-operationally valid model exists. The last consequence
is given by theorem 4.
The following theorem may help clarify the relationship between efficiency,
existence of CAC arguments, and the situation admitting a model as we con-
ceive it.
Theorem 5 (CAC subset equivalent to efficiency). Given a decision situation
(T, S∗,↝,⊲∃,⋫∃) and a subset of arguments S ⊆ S∗, there exists a set Sγ ⊆ S
that is CAC iff S is efficient.
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Proof. From [CAC implies efficiency], if some set Sγ ⊆ S is CAC, then Sγ is
efficient, and because efficiency propagates to supersets, S is efficient.
If S is efficient (thus, the decision situation is clear-cut), then a CAC subset
Sγ exists: suffices to choose as members of Sγ only the decisive arguments
required to support the justifiable propositions and trump the supporters s↝ t
of untenable propositions. Observing that no arguments trump any argument
in the resulting set (thus s⊲∃ sγ for no s ∈ S
∗, sγ ∈ Sγ), most of the conditions
for Sγ to be CAC are immediately seen to be satisfied. About arguments
s ∈ S∗ \ Sγ being unnecessary, we only have to show that when s↝ t, either
s is trumped by an argument from Sγ that is not decisively trumped, or s is
essentially replaceable by arguments from Sγ. Indeed, by our construction of
Sγ, if s supports an accepted t, it is essentially replaceable, and otherwise, it
is trumped by a decisive argument.
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